In October 2023, Jabber.ru, “the largest Russian XMPP messaging service”, discovered that both Hetzner and Linode had been targeting them with Machine-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks for up to 6 months. MITM attacks are when an unauthorised third party intercepts traffic intended for someone else. At the point of interception, the attacker can inspect and even modify that traffic. TLS was created to mitigate this; all communication between the two parties is encrypted, so the third party sees nothing but gibberish (ciphertext).

TLS is great, but it’s actually not enough when the attacker owns your network, as in Jabber.ru’s situation. Jabber.ru rented servers from Hetzner and Linode, who altered their network’s routing setup to obtain TLS certificates for Jabber.ru’s domains and successfully carry out a MITM. When connecting to an XMPP server, most clients are only configured to look for a valid certificate. A valid certificate matches the service’s domain name, is not expired, and is authorised by a known and trusted Certificate Authority (CA). If the client sees a certificate that’s signed by an unknown CA or whose expiry has passed or the domain in the cert doesn’t match the service domain or any combination of those, it’s considered invalid; the client should terminate the connection before transmitting sensitive data, such as the user’s password.

Because Hetzner and Linode controlled Jabber.ru’s network, they were able to meet all of those conditions. XMPP clients would just accept the rogue (but valid!) certificates and continue along as normal, unaware that they were actually connecting to a rogue server that forwarded their traffic (possibly with modifications) to the proper server.

A fairly straightforward mitigation involves DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities, or DANE. This is just a standard way to securely communicate to clients what certificate keys they should expect when connecting. When clients initiate a connection to the XMPP server, they receive a TLS certificate that includes a public key. If the server admin has implemented DANE, the client can verify that the public key they received matches what the server administrator said they should receive. If they don’t match, the client should terminate the connection before transmitting sensitive data.

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Some posts here indicate people don’t know the basics & are still feverishly explaining why they are so smart that they gave an NED-funded app their phone number like this is somehow defensible. Or worse posting that blog where “Soatok” argues stickers + ease of use trump technical concerns in the end. Please do not let some niche skill monopoly turn you into an egomaniac, if you are even really part of one 🤨

#privacy